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ABSTRACT
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Nick Nash
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For George Berkeley the minimum visibile and the minimum tangibile are the minimum
points that can be perceived by the senses of sight and touch (NTV 54). His account of
minima is considered by some to be central to his account of perception and his assault on
skepticism, while others view the account as simply a digression from his main theme in
the New Theory of Vision. One issue in particular that commentators disagree on is
whether or not Berkeley understands minima to be extended or not extended. I argue that
minima can only be understood as not extended. In order to do this I use an argument
very similar to one presented by David Hume. I conclude by considering why Hume uses
the argument and Berkeley doesn’t.
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Introduction
For George Berkeley the minimum visibile and the minimum tangibile are the
minimum points that can be perceived by the senses of sight and touch (NTV 54).1 His
account of minima is considered by some to be central to his account of perception and
his assault on skepticism,2 while others view the account as simply a digression from his
main theme in the New Theory of Vision.3 One issue in particular that commentators
disagree on is whether or not Berkeley understands minima to be extended or not
extended. I argue that minima can only be understood as not extended. In order to do this
I use an argument very similar to one presented by David Hume. I conclude by
considering why Hume uses the argument and Berkeley doesn’t.
In this paper I first present a number of questions and conflicts that minima bring
up in Berkeley’s account of perception. In this section I show that these problems go
away if we think about minima correctly and place them in their proper context within the
New Theory of Vision. In the next section, I argue that minima have to be understood as
not extended. This argument will bring up the question of how extension can have
minimum units that are themselves not extended. In the third part of this paper I will
answer this question. It turns out that the argument used in the second part of this paper is
very similar to an argument given by David Hume. In the fourth part of this paper I
present Hume’s arguments for the copy principle, his arguments against infinite

Throughout this paper I use Berkeley, George. 1948 The Works of George Berkeley Bishop of Cloyne. Volume 1 &
2. A. A. Luce and T.E. Jessop (ed.). New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd. The following abbreviations are
followed by section or entry number: Philosophical Commentaries: PC, An Essay Towards A New Theory of Vision:
NTV, The Principles of Human Knowledge: PHK
2 Bracken, Harry M. 1974. Berkeley. London: The Macmillan Press LTD. 26-28.
3 Armstrong, David M. 1960. Berkeley’s Theory of Vision: A Critical Examination of Biship Berkeley’s Essay Towards A
New Theory of Vision. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press. 42.
1
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divisibility, and his arguments for the idea of extension. This section ends by asking the
question of why Berkeley does not use the argument against extended minima that Hume
does. In the final part of this paper I try to answer this question.
I.
In his An Essay Towards A New Theory of Vision George Berkeley posits the
minimum tangibilia and the minimum visibilia. According to Berkeley, everyone can
have the experience of a smallest experience that they can see or touch below which they
can no longer experience. To make this idea more concrete, imagine sitting on a couch
watching a fruit fly buzz around a large room. When the fruit fly is close there is no
problem seeing it. However, because it is so small, if it flies far enough away it
disappears. This is because the visual experience of the fruit fly has gotten so small that it
can no longer be seen. The experience just before something disappears from sight is a
minimum visibile. Similarly, the experience of feeling something just before it can no
longer be felt is a minimum tangibile.
Disappearing fruit flies seem simple enough, however, trying to figure out how
minima function within Berkeley’s system brings up a lot of questions and creates a lot of
conflicts. For example: Are visibilia points of extended color that make up our visible
screen while correspondingly, the tangibilia the points of extended sensation that make
up our tactile experience?4 Or, are minima intended to be separate sensible atoms that are
stacked together to function as building blocks of the sensible world?5 And, if minima are
intended to work this way, it seems to conflict with experience since visual sensations are

As suggested by Bracken 1974 pg. 26-28.
Minima as sensible atoms is suggested by Luce, A. A. 1963. The Dialectic of Immaterialism: An Account of the
Making of Berkeley’s Principles. London: Hodder and Stoughton. While minima as the building blocks of the
sensory world comes from Armstrong 1960 pg. 39-45.
4
5
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continuous rather than constructed out of a bunch of little points or atoms.6 Perhaps,
minima are simply very small things. If so, can we even make sense of what it means to
be the smallest thing that can be seen or touched? For example, while watching a fruit fly
buzz around the room I notice that it disappears more quickly when it flies into a shadow
than when it stays in the light. Does this mean that light conditions affect a visibile?
Similarly, the smallest thing I can feel touching the back of my hand is much smaller than
the smallest thing I can feel touching my elbow. Does this mean that a tangibile is
different when it comes in contact with different parts of my body? In order to understand
how minima function and why they are important for Berkeley’s larger argument it is
helpful to put them in their proper context within the New Theory of Vision.
Berkeley’s first set of arguments in the New Theory of Vision show that the visual
perception of distance cannot come from sight alone. He begins this argument by
claiming that everyone agrees that distance cannot be seen immediately in itself and so,
must be seen mediately by means of something else. Knowing that a person is angry
because their face is red is an example of knowing something mediately, while the angry
person knows their anger immediately. Berkeley’s argument continues by noting that
although we cannot see distance immediately we do see distance, so it must come
mediately from some other experience. The mediate cause of distance perception for
Berkeley is the experience of associating certain things that we see with corresponding
distances. So, for example, I can watch a fruit fly buzz across the room and know that it
is getting farther away from me because of my immediate visual sensation of the fruit fly
combined with my mediate experience of knowing that as the fruit fly gets smaller it is

As suggested by Brook, Richard J. 1973. Berkeley’s Philosophy of Science. The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus
Nijhoff. pg. 67-76.
6
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getting farther away from me. At this point in his argument Berkeley further refines what
is available to us immediately through sight by claiming that sight provides us only with
light and color.
If sight only provides us with light and color, then touch must be responsible for
our sense of outness or space. This distinction between the senses leads Berkeley to argue
that our sense of sight and our sense of touch must provide us with access to two distinct
objects. This is known as the heterogeneity thesis. As Berkeley puts it, “The true
consequence is that the objects of sight and touch are two distinct things. (NTV 49)”
This claim first comes up near the conclusion of Berkeley’s argument against the visual
perception of distance at NTV 49. According to Berkeley, “[I]t must be acknowledged
that we never see and feel one and the same object. That which is seen is one thing, and
that which is felt is another.” So for example, as I type this paper, although I may think
that the keyboard that I see and the keyboard that I touch are the same keyboard,
according to Berkeley, they are two separate objects.
Berkeley himself recognizes that this is a difficult claim to accept, especially
because we are in the habit of referring to objects of sight and objects of touch by the
same name. Because of the heterogeneity thesis there are two types of experiences each
with their own distinct magnitude or extension. One of these experiences, represented by
light and color, is properly visual and so is perceived and measured immediately by sight.
Visual perceptions have no fixed size. So for example, the same fruit fly can be tiny if I
am looking at it from across the room or, giant if it is sitting on the tip of my nose. The
other type of perception is properly tangible and so is perceived and measured
immediately by touch. According to Berkeley, the size of objects that we perceive by
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touch is fixed. That is to say, the tangible size doesn’t vary in different circumstances.
That this claim is true is supported by experience. Regardless whether I pluck the fruit fly
off my nose or at arms length out of the air—the size I feel does not change. So, for
Berkeley, our visual perception of size comes to us mediately by means of associating the
variable sizes of objects that we experience immediately with their corresponding fixed
tactile experiences.
Understanding that Berkeley holds the heterogeneity thesis is important for
making sense of his arguments about minima. With the heterogeneity thesis in mind the
work that minima do within Berkeley’s larger argument begin to become clearer. Each of
these extensions—one that is the proper object of sight, and one that is the proper object
of touch—can be bigger or smaller depending on the context. It is while discussing the
size of these two extensions that Berkeley first mentions minima when he says, “For,
whatever may be said of extension in abstract, it is certain sensible extension is not
infinitely divisible. There is a Minimum Tangibile and a Minimum Visibile, beyond which
sense cannot perceive. This every one’s experience will inform him.” (NTV 54)
For Berkeley, minima are intended to represent the lower limit of our sensible
experience. So, any experience smaller than a minimum visibile cannot be seen, and any
experience smaller than a minimum tangibile cannot be felt. Following this point, sensible
extension, unlike extension in the abstract is not infinitely divisible. We know this
because if we start to divide sensible extension smaller and smaller we will eventually
arrive at something that is at the lower limit of our experience. Once the thing being
divided drops below our minimum experience it can’t be divided any longer because we
can’t experience it. This lower limit is a minimum.

6
Berkeley’s claim about infinite divisibility is in response to those who hold that
extension is infinitely divisible. The argument for the infinite divisibility of extension is
straightforward. No matter how big or how small the piece of extension, it would seem
that this piece could always be divided in half. So extension is infinitely divisible. This
result has been thought to give rise to any number of paradoxes and problems.7
It is important to read Berkeley’s claim about infinite divisibility through the
heterogeneity thesis. Without the heterogeneity thesis in mind you might imagine cutting
up a piece of extension—let’s say a grain of wheat—until you can no longer see it. Let’s
imagine however that you can still feel it under your knife, and so are still able to divide
it a few more times. Isn’t this an example of dividing a piece of extension that you can no
longer sense? No. Because of the heterogeneity thesis, properly speaking, when you are
dividing your grain of wheat you are actually experiencing the division of two objects.
One is the proper object of sight and the other the proper object of touch. So, what you
are feeling under your knife is tangible extension. Since the visual experience of the grain
of wheat has dropped below a minimum visibile it can no longer be seen. It is also
important to remember that Berkeley is not claiming that when an experience drops
below our lower limit of sense the thing that had been being experienced stops existing.
As a fruit fly buzzes around my living room it doesn’t blink out of existence when it is
too far away for me to see it. Instead, sometimes it is below the lower limit of my visual
perception.
So Berkeley has shown, using the heterogeneity thesis and minima, that
experience proves that sensible extension is not infinitely divisible. However, as
7

For more on this issue see Jesseph, Douglas 1993. Berkeley’s Philosophy of Mathematics. Chicago, IL: University
of Chicago Press pg. 72-85.
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mentioned previously, trying to figure out how minima are suppose to work within
Berkeley’s account of perception bring up a number of problems. Figuring out the
solution to these problems is particularly important for Berkeley’s overall argument. This
is because if his account of minima can’t be made to mirror our actual experience his
argument against the infinite divisibility of substance, which is based in our experience,
is undermined.
One problem that minima bring up has to do with whether they are intended to be
separate sensible atoms that are stacked together to function as building blocks of the
sensible world.8 If minima are intended to work this way, it seems to conflict with
experience since visual sensations are continuous rather than constructed out of a bunch
of little points or atoms.9 For example, I know the fruit fly just before it disappears is an
example of experiencing a minimum visibile but my bookshelf doesn’t seem to be
constructed out of a bunch of little distinct dots all about the same size as the fruit fly
before it disappears. If individual minima are stacked together to build sensible extension,
as this understanding of minima would seem to suggest, there has to be some explanation
for why we don’t see the world as a bunch of pixels on a computer screen. This brings up
the related question of whether minima are simply very small things. These concerns go
away however if we think about minima in the right way.
When considering the characteristics of minima difficulties arise because of
misunderstandings about the role that sensible minima are supposed to play for Berkeley.
Berkeley is not suggesting that that we experience the world as composed of tiny dots or
as the pixels in a computer screen. Minima are not to be thought of as units that are used

8
9

Luce 1963 pg. 76 and Armstrong 1960 pg. 39-45.
Brook 1973 67-76.
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to construct the sensory world. Instead they are best thought of as a way of talking about
the limits of our visual capacities. When Berkeley makes claims about a minimum visibile
his claim is that our capacity to experience size has a smallest limit on its lower bound.10
For Berkeley we can only experience a magnitude that we can perceive. So, since we
cannot see something except as having a certain size there will be a lower limit on the
smallest thing that we can see.11
Whether or not the things that we experience exist mind-independently, the
experience of an individual’s perceptions cannot be mind independent. Small objects can
have parts smaller than can be seen. A minimum visibile should not be confused with a
very small object. An object of any size can, depending on our situation, be minimally
visible to a perceiver. 12 If I drop a piano on you from high enough, if you happen to be
looking up, the piano will enter your vision as a minimally visible point.
For a perceiver to report that something is minimally visible is a report of the
same experience regardless of what object is being experienced or who (or what) visual
faculty is doing the perceiving. To ask a question about the size of a minimum visibile is
to ask about a perceiver’s visual capacities, not to ask a question about the size of the
object that it being perceived.13
Another related worry is whether we can we even make sense of what it means to
be the smallest experience that can be seen or touched?14 According to this concern we
cannot make sense of the smallest experience that can be seen or touched because our
powers of visual discrimination vary. In support of this, it would seem that in different
Atherton, Margaret. 1990. Berkeley’s Revolution in Vision. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press pg. 115116
11 Atherton 1990 pg. 116-117
12 Atherton 1990 pg. 134-135
13 Atherton 1990 pg. 134-135
14 Bracken 1974 pg. 26-28
10
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light conditions our smallest visual experience changes. In terms of touch, the smallest
experience that can be felt on the back of the hand—which is sensitive—is different from
the smallest experience that can be felt on the elbow. However, to argue that we cannot
make sense of the smallest experience that can be seen or touched because of the
variability of our perceptual experience is only a concern if minima have a fixed
phenomenal size. As was just mentioned however asking a question about the size of a
minimum is to ask about a perceiver’s capacities, not about the size of the object being
perceived. That for Berkeley minima are not intended to be fixed is clear if we consider
his arguments surrounding minima.
At NTV 80 Berkeley claims that a minimum is the same for both a mite and for a
person. At first this claim seems crazy. A person is so much bigger than a mite. How
could they both have the same minimum visibile? However, with the heterogeneity thesis
in mind, since vision is only immediately of light and color, and distance and size
perception are suggested mediately, through touch, the claim that a minimum visibile is
the same in both a person and a mite is just to say that both a person and a mite have a
minimum limit on their faculty of vision below which they cannot perceive. If we are
concerned about the difference in the smallest experience that can be seen in differing
light conditions, or the difference between my minimum visibile and a mite’s, then we
would also have to conclude that the minimum visibile of a mite would have to be much
smaller than my minimum visibile. This however is exactly what Berkeley is arguing
against in NTV 80 when he claims that minima are the same for all.
Fixed minima also conflict with Berkeley’s analysis of microscopes. Because the
experiences that we feel and the experiences that we see are separate, united by
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experience, looking through a microscope severs this connection making the things we
see no longer related to the things that we touch in the same way that they were
previously. Because of this, having microscope eyes would not at first be helpful. Also,
looking though a microscope does not change the fact that we have a lower limit on our
visual faculty represented by the minimum visibile or change the size of a minimum. Even
when looking through a microscope there is still a lower limit on the visual faculty. So, a
microscope neither make us see more visible points or make the visible points that we do
see more clear and distinct. When looking through a microscope, in terms of there being
minima, nothing changes. All that changes, as Berkeley would put it, is the world that we
are in, or what we are looking at. This world and what we see in it still can be reduced to
minima. However, if minima were fixed, our powers of visual discrimination would
affect the way that we perceive minima. If this was the case, when we looked through a
microscope minima would become clearer and larger. This however, again, is exactly
what Berkeley is arguing against.
II.
Now that minima have been placed within Berkeley’s larger argument in the New
Theory of Vision, and the problems that have been raised against his account have been
solved, we need to consider the question of whether a minimum is extended or not
extended. The answer to this question comes from considering the arguments surrounding
the divisibility of substance.
Problems over the divisibility of extension come up because any piece of
extension no matter how big or small can always be divided. Because of this, extension
appears to be infinitely divisible. Berkeley responded to this argument by first showing
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that our visual experience and our tactile experience provide access to different objects.15
He then turned to experience to show that both our visual and our tactile senses have a
minimum limit. He called this limit a minimum and then used it to show that experience
proves that sensible extension is not infinitely divisible.
Both sides in this argument agree that extension is divisible. One side argues that
it is divisible infinitely while the other side argues that it is divisible a finite number of
times. Following this, exactly how many times extension is divisible depends on an
individual’s perception. An argument that minima are not extended follows from the
agreement that extension is divisible:
(i)

Extension is divisible

(ii)

A minimum, by definition is not divisible

(iii)

So, a minimum is not extended.

If this argument is right it seems to have at least one strange consequence. In
order to draw this out let’s start with an experience of extension—perhaps the previously
mentioned grain of wheat. If I divide it in half, I now experience two extended half-grains
of wheat. Now, if I divide it a second time I am experiencing four quarter-grains of
wheat. But, let’s say that if I divide it a third time it would fall below my visual threshold.
So, now the piece of wheat that I am experiencing represent minimum of visual
perception. In fact, if I have been dividing all of the pieces of wheat equally, then all four
of the pieces of wheat that I am experiencing are all minimum visibilia.16 The strange

Although this is an important part of Berkeley’s overall argument in the New Theory of Vision it is an
important first step in his argument against infinite divisibility because by first showing that our visual
experience and our tactile experience provide access to different objects, when he then goes on to argue that
sensible extension is not infinitely divisible because we have a minimum experience of it represented by minima
he blocks the objection considered above involving feeling the grain of wheat being divided with a knife even
thought it can no longer be seen.
16 In this example I am using a minimum visibile but the same example could be set up for a minimum tangibile.
15
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consequence of the above argument is that the first time I divided the piece of wheat both
of the pieces I was experiencing were extended. However when I divided it again—this
time to a point where if I were to divide it one more time it would fall below my visual
threshold—now, all four pieces of wheat that I am experiencing are not extended. This
would seem to suggest that once something is a minimum it somehow has different
characteristics than an extended thing. Somehow just by dividing the half-grains of wheat
into quarter grains the characteristics of the wheat changed.
That this is what Berkeley has in mind becomes more reasonable if we consider
his presentation of minimum visibile and minimum tangibile in the New Theory of Vision.
As has been mentioned previously, Berkeley first introduces minima in NTV 54 as a key
premise in his argument against the infinite divisibility of substance. He doesn’t go more
in depth in his explanation at this point because all he needs for his argument is for the
reader to have had a minimum experience “beyond which sense cannot perceive.” From
this he can get to his desired conclusion that “whatever may be said of extension in
abstract, it is certain that sensible extension is not infinitely divisible.” When Berkeley
returns to minima however it is clear that he takes minima to have different characteristics
than extended perceptions because he begins presenting and arguing for these
characteristics. In addition, many of these characteristics—such as in NTV 81 when he
argues that a minimum visibile of a mite and of a person are the same—seem like claims
that couldn’t be made about extended experiences. So, that Berkeley intended for minima
to have different characteristics than extended experiences follows from his presentation.
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If it is accepted that Berkeley intends that minima be not extended, this leaves him
in a curious place. If when a visible or tangible sensation is reduced to its lowest sensible
limit it is not extended then, how can extension be derived from sensible minima?
III.
I have argued that individual minima are best understood as not extended.17 This
however brings up a further problem of how extension can be derived from sensible
minima that are not extended. My claim is that for Berkeley extension is formed by the
relationship between more than a single minimum. It is this relationship that makes up
extension. Extension just is a relationship between minimum experiences of sensation.
These points if experienced in isolation are not extended, but when experienced together
form extension.
In order to support this position, and to reinforce the claim that minima are
intended to have different characteristics from extended experiences, I first look at entries
from the Philosophical Commentaries. The Philosophical Commentaries are notebooks
that Berkeley kept while working through many of the arguments in his early work. They
contain a large number of entries concerning minima. I start with entry 321 in the
Philosophical Commentaries. In this entry Berkeley says:
Qu: why difficult to imagine a minimum. Ans. Because we are not us’d to take notice of ’em
singly, they not being able singly to pleasure or hurt us thereby to deserve our regard.

Here, Berkeley is asking the question why it is difficult to imagine a minimum. His
answer is that they are difficult to imagine because we are not used to noticing them
individually. The reason for this, he continues, is that alone they are not able to provide

For two different arguments that minima are not extended see Raynor, David 1980. “Minima Sensibilia in
Berkeley and Hume.” Dialogue 19, 196-200 and Schwartz, Robert 2006. Visual Versions. Cambridge, MA: The
MIT Press 42-44.
17
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us with pleasure or to hurt us. He isn’t however arguing that we are not able to feel
pleasure or pain. So, wherever this pleasure or pain comes from, it must come from more
than a single minimum.
If we consider a minimum to be extended, and so in terms of extension there is no
difference between a minimum and any other extended experience, this claim about
pleasure and pain would be problematic. There doesn’t seem to be any reason why an
extended minimum wouldn’t provide us with pleasure or hurt us while more than a single
minimum would. This is unless we were thinking of a minimum as simply something that
is too small to provide us with pleasure or to hurt us. However, it has been shown above
that this is not the way to think about a minimum. So, the claim that a minimum can’t help
or hurt us provides additional support for the claim that Berkeley intends for minimum
have different characteristics from extended sensation because he is clearly making a
distinction between minima and extension. Minima, alone are not able to cause us
pleasure or to hurt us, but since we obviously feel pleasure and pain this must come from
something that is more than a single minimum.
So, if a single minimum is not able to cause pleasure or hurt us, but more than a
single minimum is, there must be an explanation for this. Although this entry does not
directly consider the question of what makes extension it does so indirectly by telling us
what doesn’t make extension. We know that a single minimum isn’t extended. Also, from
this entry we know that a single minimum can’t cause us pleasure or hurt us. Yet we
obviously do feel pleasure and pain so, this pleasure and pain must come from an
experience that is more than a minimum and so is extended. Because of this, this entry
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indirectly shows that there must be some way to get extension from the relation between
more than one minima, that when experienced alone is not extended.
More direct evidence that Berkeley intends for extension to come from the
relation between minima comes from Philosophical commentaries entry 78. In this entry
Berkeley gives an account of Locke’s view of extension contrasting body and space.18 He
follows this with his own view, in entry 78a, with “Why may not I say visible extension
is a continuity of visible points tangible extension is a Continuity of tangible points.”
Here, rather than body and space, Berkeley is contrasting visible and tangible extension.
Both are made up of a continuous amount of points. If we believe that minima are
extended this entry amounts to little more than the claim that a continuous amount of
extended visible and tangible points make up visible and tangible extension. There
doesn’t seem to be any particular reason to make this claim however. If minima visibilia
and minima tangibilia were extended then, of course visible extension would be made
from a continuous amount of visible points and tangible extension would be a continuous
amount of tangible points.
However, if minima are understood as not extended this entry must be read
differently. It is clear from this entry that what Berkeley is trying to do is to give an
account of visual and tangible extension. If we begin trying to understand this account
knowing that minima are not extended what comes out is that for Berkeley visible
extension is formed by a continuity of visible points while tangible extension is formed
by a continuity of tangible points. Because we know that individual minima are not
extended but the account that Berkeley is giving is of extension, extension must come

The suggestion that Berkeley is contrasting his view with Locke’s comes from the editor’s notes to PC. Pg.
111
18
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from somewhere. It is also clear from this account that the place that Berkeley intends for
the extension to come from is from the relationship between the points that we know
alone are not extended.
The claim that extension is formed relationally becomes more plausible if we
consider the relation that must be formed between visible and tangible extension.
Although Berkeley argues with the heterogeneity thesis that experiences of sight and
experiences of touch are separate experiences he isn’t arguing that these separate objects
have no relation to each other. In fact the relationship between visible and tangible
extension is central to Berkeley’s project. For example, we are able to see distance and
tangible size because of the relationship between the objects that we touch and the objects
that we see. If the relationship between experiences of sight and touch is important
enough in Berkeley’s account to lead to the ability to see distance and size it is a small
step to believe that a relationship between minima visibilia forms visible extension while
a relationship between minima tangibilia forms tangible extension.
An example of Berkeley using a relation between visible and tangible extension is
in NTV 62 when Berkeley is arguing that there is no necessary connection formed
between the ideas of sight and touch.
Because our eyes might have been framed in such a manner as to be able to see nothing but what
were less than the minimum tangible. In which case it is not impossible we might have perceived
all the immediate objects of sight, the very same that we do now : But unto those visible
appearances there would not be connected those different tangible magnitudes that are now. (NTV
62)

In this passage Berkeley sets up a situation in which the tangible magnitudes that we
currently associate with corresponding visual magnitudes are changed. From this
example it is clear that the particular phenomenal experience of visible size that we now
associate with a minimum visible could have instead been associated with a different
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phenomenal size of a minimum tangible. This means that it is not our particular
experiences of phenomenal minima that make up our visual experience of size. Instead, it
is their relationship between minima tangibilia and minima visibilia.
That the relationship between visible and tangible extension is central to
Berkeley’s overall argument also finds support in the New Theory of Vision. In the
following passage Berkeley is giving an explanation of why we think visible objects and
tangible objects are the same object in spite of the heterogeneity thesis that shows that
they are separate.
These signs are constant and universal, their connexion with tangible ideas has been learnt at our
first entrance into the world ; and ever since, almost every moment of our lives, it has been
occurring to our thoughts, and fastening and striking deeper on our minds. When we observe that
signs are variable, and of human institution ; when we remember that there was a time they were
not connected in our minds with those things they now so readily suggest ; but that their
signification was learned by the slow steps of experience : This preserves us from confounding
them. (NTV 144)

The signs that Berkeley is talking about are our visual experiences that we associate with
particular tangible experiences. He is arguing that as long as we have been able to see, we
have been associating particular visual experiences with other tangible experiences.
Because of this constant association the connection between the two is very deep.
However, we are able to observe that visible experience and tangible experience are not
always universally connected. From this we can realize that this association is learned.
Because this connection is learned, we can know that visible experiences of objects and
tangible experiences of objects are experiences of separate objects.
Another way to frame this passage is to say that Berkeley is arguing that what is
mistakenly understood to be one extension is in fact two separate extensions, one visible
and the other tangible. This mistake is made because the regular experience of the
relationship between the two extensions makes them seem like one extension. Although
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in this situation the relationship between the two extensions is misleading it is clear that it
is an important part of our daily lives.
For Berkeley the experience that we mistake to be a single extension is formed by
the relationship between two separate extensions one visible and the other tangible. The
relationship between these two extensions is so important that it leads to our experience
distance and size. If it is a relationship between experiences of visible extension and
experiences of tangible extension that lead to our experience of distance and size, it is a
small step to believe that it is a relationship between minima visibilia that form visible
extension and between minima tangibilia that form tangible extension.
As it turns out, the argument that I used in section two to show that a minimum
cannot be extended is very similar to an argument that David Hume uses in A Treatise of
Human Nature to show that a simple indivisible idea cannot be an idea of extension. In
the next part of this paper I present Hume’s copy principle and his arguments against
infinite divisibility and conclude with his argument for why a simple indivisible idea
cannot be an idea of extension. This will bring up the question of why Hume explicitly
argues this way while Berkeley does not. In the final section I try to answer this question.
IV.
In order to best make sense of Hume’s argument for why a simple indivisible idea
cannot be an idea of extension it is necessary to first consider his copy principle and his
arguments against the infinite divisibility of substance.
The copy principle
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The copy principle is Hume’s claim that all simple ideas are formed from copies
of simple impressions.19 In order to arrive at this claim, Hume divides perceptions into
two types—impressions and ideas. For Hume, that this distinction will be clear is
obvious. Impressions have more force and liveliness than ideas and are perceptions that
include hearing, seeing, feeling, loving, hating, and willing as well as all our sensations
passions and emotions. (EHU 2.3) Ideas, by comparison, occur in thinking and reasoning
and are less lively than perceptions. We are conscious of ideas when we reflect on
anything from the above list.
An example makes this distinction clearer. When I am sitting by a campfire I feel
an impression of the heat caused by the fire (among other impressions that may include
the color of the fire and the smell of the smoke). This impression has much force and
liveliness. However, when I am lying in my tent reflecting on the fire I can form an idea
of the heat from the fire. This idea of the heat from the fire comes from the impression of
the heat of the fire. However, an idea of fire does not have as much force or liveliness as
the impression of the fire. What Hume has in mind is fairly straightforward. The idea that
I form while reflecting on the heat from a fire will never have the same force as the actual
experience of heat from a fire. This difference can be easily summarized as the
distinction between feeling something and thinking about it. (THN 1.1.1.1)
In order to arrive at the copy principle Hume further divides impressions and
ideas into simple and complex. A simple impression is an impression that cannot be
broken down. In the above example, the heat from the fire is a simple impression because
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the feeling of heat cannot be broken down further into more simple impressions.
Similarly, if I am looking at an apple, the red of the apple is a simple impression because
the impression of the color red cannot be broken down into further simple impressions.
Complex impressions and ideas, on the other hand, are impressions and ideas that
can be further broken down. So, using the above example, my complex impressions of
the experience of the campfire, including the colors, and sounds, smells and heat form a
complex idea of a campfire. These impressions and ideas are complex because they can
be further broken down into simpler impressions and ideas.
It is at the level of simple impressions that the copy principle arises. As
mentioned above, the copy principle is Hume’s claim that all simple ideas are formed
from copies of simple impressions. Complex ideas on the other hand do not have to come
from exact copies of complex impressions. So for example, I can have a complex idea of
a city that I have never been to, for example Des Moines Iowa, where the complex idea
of the city is formed from combinations of simple ideas but these complex ideas are not
an exact copy of the city of Des Moines (they may in fact be a very poor approximation
of what Des Moines is actually like). At the same time I can have a complex idea of a city
that I have lived in, for example Portland, Oregon, and yet not have a perfect copy of all
of the streets and buildings in my head. My idea of Portland is much closer to the actual
Portland than my idea of Des Moines is to the actual Des Moines, however in neither
case is my complex idea an exact copy.
One of the things that the copy principle allows Hume to do is to answer the
question of if a term we are using has any definitive meaning. If there is a possibility that
a word has been used without a clear meaning all we have to do is ask what impression
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the idea arises from and apply the copy principle to find out if we can find the
impression. If we are unable to find a simple impression then we can confirm that the
word does not have a clear meaning. (EHU 2.9) Hume applies the copy principle to a
number of different questions including to substance, personal identity, the necessary
connection between cause and effect as well as space and time.
Arguments against infinite divisibility
In book one part two of the Treatise Hume considers arguments against the
infinite divisibility of space and time. He begins his analysis of infinite divisibility by
considering the ideas of space and time.
According to Hume “ ‘Tis universally allow’d, that the capacity of the mind is
limited, and can never attain a full and adequate conception of infinity.” His argument
against the infinite divisibility continues, that whatever is capable of being divided
infinitely must consist of an infinite number of parts. Because for Hume it is impossible
to set a bound on the number of parts without also setting a bound to their division, he
concludes that the idea that we form of any finite quality is not infinitely divisible.
(T1.2.1.2)
Hume’s next argument against infinite divisibility builds on his previous
conclusion that the idea that we form of any finite quality is not infinitely divisible.
Because the imagination reaches a minimum which cannot get any smaller, Hume claims
that if you tell him about a thousandth or ten thousandth part of a grain of sand, he can
have a distinct idea of these numbers and of their different proportions but the images
which he forms in his mind to represent these different parts are not different from each
other. Also, these images in his mind are no different from the image which he uses to
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represent the grain of sand itself which is suppose to be one thousand or ten thousand
time larger. Following this observation Hume claims that what consists of parts is
distinguishable into them, and what is distinguishable is separable. However, whatever
we may imagine of a grain of sand the idea of a grain of sand is not distinguishable or
separable into even twenty different parts let alone an infinite amount. (T1.2.1.3)
After this Hume extends his argument from ideas in the imagination to the senses.
In order to do this he provides an experiment. First, put a spot of ink on a piece of paper
and back up until it disappears. According to Hume, the moment before the spot
disappears, the impression formed by the dot is perfectly indivisible. Following from this
Hume gives his account of how a microscope or telescope affects this when he claims
that when one of these devices makes something visible that previously wasn’t, it doesn’t
produce new rays of light [perhaps best understood as new instances of light and color],
but instead spreads out instances of light and color that were already there. Because of
this these devices are able to give parts to impressions that to the naked eye appear simple
and uncompounded, while at the same time increasing to minimum instances of light and
color that were previously imperceptible. (T1.2.1.4)
Hume next goes on to show the error in the common opinion that it is impossible
for the mind to form an adequate idea of what goes beyond a certain degree of
minuteness as well as of greatness. We form ideas of some very small objects in our
imagination. Also, the minimum ideas that appear to our senses are the smallest things
that we can sense. However, our senses provide us with disproportionate images of things
that represent as indivisible things that are really composed of a great number of parts.
Because we take our impressions of objects from the senses to be equal to the object, and
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through reason find that there are other objects much smaller, we quickly come to the
conclusion that these ideas of our imagination are inferior to any idea of our imagination
or impression of our senses. It is however certain that we can form ideas of very small
things. So, instead we should conclude that the difficulty lies in enlarging our conception
so much that we can form a notion of a very small mite or even a notion of something
much smaller than a mite. In order to form this notion we have to have distinct ideas
representing every part of the thing that we are forming the notion of. However according
to the argument in favor of infinite divisibility we cannot form a notion of every part of
these things because there are an infinite amount of parts. (T1.2.1.5)
The idea of extension
Next, Hume begins considering the qualities of space and time by applying the
copy principle. He claims that we acquire the idea of extension by opening our eyes and
looking at the objects that surround us and then by closing our eyes and considering the
distance between them. Because for Hume, according to the copy principle, every idea
comes from an impression that is exactly similar to it, the impressions similar to the idea
of extension, Hume shortly concludes, must come from sight. (T1.2.3.2)
Since, for Hume, we are able to get our idea of extension from looking at things
Hume concludes that the impression that this idea comes from must be available to sight.
Because from sight we receive impressions of only colored points disposed in a certain
manner Hume concludes that the idea of extension has to come from the impression
copied from these colored points. (T1.2.3.4)
Hume next claims that we form an abstract idea of extension based merely on the
disposition of these points rather than on their particular color. It is important to
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remember that for Hume abstract ideas are just particular ideas used in a general way to
represent a wide variety of objects. So, from all of our experiences of particular colored
points arranged in various ways we are able to form an abstract idea of extension. We are
even able to carry this abstract idea of extension beyond simply the sense of sight when
we discover that objects of touch are similar to objects of sight. This allows the abstract
idea of extension to represent both objects of sight and touch. (T1.2.3.5)
After spending some time considering the characteristics of time and how it is
related to space, Hume mentions that there is a very decisive argument that establishes
his present doctrine concerning our ideas of space and time. This argument comes from
the claim that our ideas of space and time are formed by the composition of parts that are
indivisible. (T1.2.3.12)
He begins by considering one simple indivisible idea the compound of which
forms extension. Although Hume does not use the word in this context, clearly what he
has in mind is that this simple indivisible idea is a perceptual minimum. He continues by
claiming that this cannot be the idea of extension because the idea of extension consists
of parts. This idea however is perfectly simple and indivisible. So, whatever else may be
said of this perceptual minimum, it cannot form the idea of extension because extension is
divisible. Hume then continues to investigate the characteristics of these perceptual
minima that are not extended. He first rules out that they might be nothing. Nothing is a
characteristic he equates with being real. According to Hume these indivisible perceptual
minima can’t be nothing because the compound idea of extension is real and so the
compound idea of extension can’t be composed of pieces that are not real or are nothing.
Since the two types of things that we can perceive that might make up the idea of

25
extension must be either colored or tangible Hume settles on the claim that these
minimum points are necessarily colored or tangible because we have to be able to
perceive them. Although these perceptual minima are colored or tangible they are not by
themselves extended because they are not divisible. (T1.2.3.14-17)
One similarity that should be noticed however is that the argument that Hume
uses to claim that the idea of extension can not come from the impressions of perceptual
minima that are indivisible is very similar to the argument that I used above to show that
for Berkeley minima can’t be extended. The argument from above is:
(iv)

Extension is divisible.

(v)

A minimum, by definition is not divisible.

(vi)

So, a minimum is not extended.

Hume’s argument is:
(i)

A simple indivisible idea does not have any parts.

(ii)

The idea of extension consists of parts.

(iii)

So, a simple indivisible idea cannot be an idea of extension.

Setting aside the differences in the arguments caused by Hume’s use of the
distinction between impressions and ideas, a question that we might ask is why Hume
explicitly uses this argument while Berkeley does not? Why is it important for Hume to argue
this way while Berkeley leaves it for us to discover by ourselves? In the final section of this
paper I will try to answer these questions.
V.
One reason that Berkeley may not use the argument that I have provided for
minima not being extended is that he does not have access to the copy principle. When
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first considering the copy principle it may seem like the important distinction that it
allows is between impressions and ideas. This distinction is important, and in fact one of
the differences between my argument and Hume’s is that Hume’s argument is presented
using ideas while mine is presented simply using extension. However, I think that what
the copy principle allows in this situation is the ability to isolate simple impressions and
ideas in a way that Berkeley does not have available. It is this isolation that Hume’s
argument turns on, and since Berkeley does not have this same ability to isolate simple
impressions and ideas that is provided by the copy principle he does not provide the
argument that I have given for non-extended minima.
In order to better explain my point I will consider the first premise of Hume’s
argument:
(i) A simple indivisible idea does not have any parts.
and compare it to the corresponding premise of my argument (which in this case is the
second premise):
(ii) A minimum, by definition, is not divisible.
A simple indivisible idea is available for Hume to use as a premise because of the copy
principle. Since the copy principle takes a simple impression, and from it forms a simple
idea, the claim that a simple indivisible idea does not have any parts is a premise he is
able to arrive at. What the copy principle does in this situation is isolate simple
impressions and ideas so that they can be talked about apart from other impressions and
ideas. In the corresponding premise of my argument, on the other hand, the indivisibility
comes only from the definition of a minimum.
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For Berkeley, although a minimum is necessarily a singular thing he doesn’t have
need to talk about minima in isolation. Instead, for Berkeley, we only experience minima
against and among other experiences. When I am sitting on my couch and the fruit fly
that is flying around my living room is reduced to a perceptual minimum just before it
disappears even though at that moment I am perceiving a minimum visisbilia, I am
experiencing it against the backdrop of other visual perceptions, in this case all the rest of
the stuff that I also see in my living room. For Berkeley our visual field is always the
same size regardless of what we are looking at. His system has no way of isolating a
single minimum and no need. This is why Berkeley does not use the argument that I have
presented for non-extended minima.
I have just claimed that Berkeley’s system has no way and no need to isolate a
single minimum. Yet, if my above analysis is correct, it is the ability to isolate a single
minimum that would allow Berkley to argue the way that I argue on his behalf. One way
of showing that Berkeley’s system has the ability to isolate a single minimum, and so
could use my argument, that seems promising involves showing that Berkeley could hold
the copy principle. In order to try to show that Berkeley could hold the copy principle I
will begin by considering some important differences between Berkeley and Hume’s
accounts.
One immediate difference between Berkeley’s account and Hume’s is Hume’s
lack of the heterogeneity thesis. For Berkeley the heterogeneity thesis holds that
experiences of sight and experiences of touch are actually experiences of separate
objects. The heterogeneity thesis is important for Berkeley because he uses it as a part of
his argument against infinite divisibility. Although Hume does not argue for the
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heterogeneity thesis it may seem possible to arrive at the heterogeneity thesis through the
copy principle.
According to the copy principle, simple ideas are copied from identical simple
impressions. Because of the discussion of the source of the idea of extension in Hume,
we know that the idea of extension comes from an abstract idea formed from the
combination of simple minimum impression of touch and simple minimum impressions
of sight. Although these simple impressions are used together to form the abstract idea of
extension, when considered by themselves, as just simple impressions, these simple
impressions must be separate and distinct from each other in a way similar to what the
heterogeneity thesis requires.
Although something like the heterogeneity thesis may hold for Hume when
considering simple impressions, the heterogeneity thesis stops holding when we begin to
consider complex impressions. Remember that for Berkeley, because of the heterogeneity
thesis, as I am typing this paper, although the keyboard that I experience with touch, and
the keyboard that I experience with sight appear to be the same keyboard, because of the
heterogeneity thesis, they are in fact separate keyboards. One keyboard is the proper
object of sight while the other is the proper object of touch. However, for Hume, although
the impressions that are used to form the idea of extension are simple, the idea of
extension itself is complex and involves an abstraction between ideas of sight and ideas
of touch. Because of this, the heterogeneity thesis would not hold for Hume for the idea
of an extended object.
But, just because we might not be able to get the heterogeneity thesis out of the
copy principle, this does not mean that we can’t get the copy principle out of the
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heterogeneity thesis. Although Berkeley does not consider minima in isolation, if he were
going to, a minimum tangibilie and a minimum visibilie would have to be examples of
simple impressions. Because, according to the heterogeneity thesis, experiences of sight
and experiences of touch are experiences of separate objects these minimum perceptions
of sight and touch would necessarily have to be simple. If Berkeley held the copy
principle, the simple impressions formed by minimum visibile and the minimum tangibile
would have to form simple impressions. This is not to say that Hume’s theory of ideas is
compatible with Berkeley’s. I am only trying to show that, should he want to, Berkeley
has the resources to isolate simple impressions and their corresponding ideas in the same
way that Hume does.
Berkeley doesn’t have a reason to isolate single minimum tangibilie and minimum
visibilie however. Considering why this is will make a point about the difference in the
way that minima work in Berkeley and Hume’s systems.
The closest thing that Berkeley has to the copy principle is what is known as the
likeness principle. Berkeley presents this principle in The Principles of Human
Knowledge while trying to undermine the representationalist response to his argument:
But say you, though the ideas themselves do not exist without the mind, yet there may be things like them
wherof they are copies or resemblances, which things exist without the mind, in an unthinking substance. I
answer, an idea can be like nothing but an idea ; a colour or figure can be like nothing but another colour or
figure. (PHK 8)

The copy principle requires simple impressions in order to form simple ideas, while the
likeness principle requires likeness between two things. So, as Berkeley says, an idea can
only be like another idea, while a color or a figure has to be like another color or figure.
Notice also that the copy principle requires simples while the likeness principle has no
such restrictions. This point about simples brings out a good reason why Berkeley does
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not argue as I have above. It also marks an important difference between Berkeley and
Hume’s account of minima.
For Hume, because of the copy principle, impressions must enter the mind as
ideas from exact copies of simple impressions. In order for this to work, extension must
be made up of parts that can be broken down into perceptual minima. Because of this,
Hume presents an account of extended objects being built up out of minimum
perceptions. Another way to put this is that for Hume, minima are blocks that extension is
somehow built out of. For Berkeley however all that is required by the likeness principle
is that ideas resemble other ideas. Because of this there is no need for extension to be
built up out of perceptual minima. In fact, it is not built up out of perceptual minima.
Instead, for Berkley, rather than a building block, a minimum represents a lower limit on
our ability to perceive.
This line of argument has the curious effect of pointing out an error in section
three. Although I tried to argue that for Berkeley extension is formed by the relationship
between individual minima it now appears that for Berkeley extension is just formed by
perceiving extended things. The upshot however is that it becomes clear that Berkeley
and Hume have very different understanding of what a minima is suppose to do and how
extension is formed.
All of this still leaves open the questions of if Berkeley could use the argument
that I presented for non-extended minima. I claim that he can. My first reason for this is
that it is a good argument. Berkeley’s use of minima appears as part of his argument
against infinite divisibility. With this in mind, the first premise of my argument, that
extension is divisible, is something that both sides of the argument surrounding the
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divisibility of substance agree on. Because both sides agree I take this to be a good
premise. The second premise just follows from the definition of a minimum. A minimum
by definition is not divisible. The conclusion, that a minimum is not extended, clearly
follows from the premises provided.
Someone might object that given what I have shown, for Berkeley, a minimum
must be extended. This is because Berkeley never gives us a way to perceive a minimum
in isolation. So, even if we are perceiving a minimum it is only as a part of a larger
perception which is itself extended. Because there is no way to perceive a minimum apart
from this larger perception that is extended, a minimum must be extended.
In response to this I would argue that this argument only works if it is impossible
in Berkeley’s system to perceive a single minimum in isolation. We know that this is not
the case however because of Philosophical Commentaries entry 321. In this entry
Berkeley claims that we are not used to noticing a single minimum not that it is
impossible to do so. This supports the claim that although Berkeley does not argue as I do
in part two, it does not mean that he can’t. It only means that he has no need to because
he has no need to isolate a single minimum.
Conclusion
Commentators disagree on whether or not Berkeley understands minima to be
extended or not extended. I have argued that minima can only be understood as not
extended. This brought up the question of how extension could be formed from minima
that are not extended which I tried to answer. In order to argue that minima are not
extended I used an argument very similar to one used by David Hume. This brought up
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the question of why Hume used this argument while Berkeley did not. While trying to
answer this question I showed that Berkeley and Hume use minima differently. 20
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